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This paper examines the way trade policy is formulated in a 
representative set of Latin American countries. Despite the fact that 
the economic reform process in Latin America has been substantial, 
the benefits of the reforms are under question. Some claim that part of 
the current disenchantment with structural reforms, including trade 
policy, in Latin America may be due to the fact that the quality of 
policies and of policy implementation has been tainted by structural 
characteristics of policymaking processes.  
In recent years, the interest has arisen to know and understand 
how decisions on trade policy are taken in Latin America. This case is 
a mixture of schemes, which are more or less applicable depending on 
the actors involved internationally (multilateral, plurilateral or 
bilateral processes), how deep is the democratic tradition of the 
country in question and what is the level of organisation and 
complexity of the civil society. Bureaucracies in Latin America play a 
major role in designing and orienting the decisions on trade policy. On 
the other hand, the Legislative Power assumes an important role in the 
final stage, when it must accept or reject the terms of negotiations. 
Finally, co-ordination and consultation mechanisms within the public 
sector —and between it and other relevant players, such as the 
Legislative Power and the civil society— are weak. 
 





Formulating trade policy has become a special concern in 
modern society. In the late eighties, and largely as a result of the 
conclusions of panel reports that settled disputes dealing with 
environmental regulations under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), wide sectors of civil society organised in 
international networks emerged as interested parties to better 
understand the way multilateral trading system works and try to 
influence trade-related matters.  
The subsequent coming into effect in 1995 of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), that contained rights and obligations that went 
beyond the traditional trade-related issues, together with a stronger 
dispute-settlement system deeply involved in the countries’ 
sovereignty, resulted in deepened interest of organised groups within 
the society to take part in decisions on trade policy, to ensure 
protection and promotion of their interests. 
In a number of Latin American countries, the creation of the 
WTO was welcome in the beginning, but later on it arose concern 
when people better understood (and in some cases misunderstood) the 
extent and scope of related obligations and problems to implement it 
(see Lengyel & Ventura-Dias, 2004). 
At the same time, the issue of becoming aware of the way in 
which trade policy is devised in the region has gained increasing 
interest, as the ignorance of such matters by the society is notorious. 
Furthermore, according to the Inter-American Development Bank 
“part of the current disenchantment with structural reforms in Latin 
America may be due to the fact that the quality of policies and of 
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policy implementation has been tainted by structural characteristics of policymaking processes”. 
Therefore, in order to understand how the trade policy-making process takes place it is important to 
analyze who are the actors and how they interact.1 
In recent years, the interest has arisen to know and understand how decisions on trade policy 
are taken in Latin America. One of the approaches used has taken as its reference the works by 
Putnam (1993), who studies international negotiations as a two-level game. The first level 
represents the negotiation that takes place between states or international organisations. In the 
second level are domestic negotiations, which must be conducted by those in charge of the first 
level, in order to ensure that the results achieved at that level will be subsequently ratified. 
Obviously, these games occur simultaneously and interact with each other constantly along the 
process.  
The first level of negotiations is handled by government representatives, who can be defined 
in the terms of article 7 of the Vienna Convention. All the domestic players that can influence the 
ratification of the results of the negotiation handle the second level. These may range from 
Congress members to various representatives of the civil society, as defined in the aforesaid terms, 
which can be found in World Bank (2004). In the case of trade policy, because of the increase 
numbers of issues included in the agenda and the fact that there are more intrusive in domestic 
policies have increased the complexity of the second level of the game. 
This paper examines the way trade policy is formulated in a representative set of Latin 
American countries.2 The first section presents a brief analysis of the main trade reforms applied in 
the region and their outcomes. Section II discusses how the term “participation” is conceived in the 
formulation of public policies and the role it plays. Section III analyses participation mechanisms in 
the selected countries and their main players and the latter's involvement. The last section presents 
the main conclusions.  
The paper objective is to identify common elements and not to highlight the differences 
between countries. This approach does not ignore that some weakness are more important for some 
countries than for others, but the important message is that the problems raised are present in 
almost all the cases. 
 
                                                     
1 http://www.iadb.org/res/index.cfm?fuseaction=LaResNetwork.StudySummaryView&st_id=82  
2 This work analyses mainly the experiences of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. Except where stated otherwise, statistics refer to this group of countries. 
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I. Trade Reforms in Latin America 
In the mid-eighties, Latin American countries launched a deep 
process of economic reforms that also involved trade policy. The 
reform process in general, —and trade policies in particular— was the 
countries' response to the wide-ranging economic crisis that burst 
around 1982. However, not all processes are equal and share the same 
origin. Attaining macroeconomic stability and overcoming the foreign 
debt problem were the general objectives of the reforms, and trade 
policy was one strategic component to achieve them.  
Despite the fact that the transformation process in Latin 
America has been substantial, the benefits of the reforms are under 
question. True, macroeconomic stability has improved, particularly 
through controlled inflation, but the benefits have not passed through 
to other areas of the economy. As a matter of fact, some claim that the 
reforms have produced no gains for the region in terms of increased 
economic growth, employment or poverty alleviation. 
Countries in the Southern Cone, namely Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay, started a unilateral “neo-liberal” reform process in the mid 
seventies. But, because of the debt crisis and political overturn in 
Argentina and Uruguay, reforms were partly reversed. In Chile, a 
backlash was also observed between 1982 and 1984, but the process 
restarted in 1985, when open trade and economic transformation 
process resumed, in particular oriented at stabilising the economy and 
bringing the massive foreign debt under control. 
Other countries followed, many of them as part of adjustment 
programs backed by international organisations, which also  
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contemplated becoming member of the multilateral trading system (see table 1). 
Table 1 
TRADE REFORM IN SELECTED COUNTRIES: 1985-1992 
Country Beginning 
year 
Simple tariff average 
% 
Non tariff barriers 
coverage (%/M) 
  Beginning 1993 2003 1985-87 1991-92 
Argentina 1989 43.7 10.9 11.8 31.9 8.0 
Bolivia 1985 20.0 9.8 9.3 25.0 0.0 
Brazil 1988 50.6 14.2 12.0 35.3 8.0 
Colombia 1989 47.6 11.7 11.6 73.2 1.0 
Costa Rica 1985 53.0 11.7 5.9 0.8 0.0 
Chile 1973 94.0 10.0a  n.a n.a 
 1985 35.0 11.0 6.0 10.1 0.0 
Ecuador 1985 50.0 9.3 11.3 59.3 n.a 
Mexico 1985 34.0 13.0 17.3 12.7 20.0 
Paraguay 1985 71.3 9.2 11.3 9.9 0.0 
Peru 1989 68.1 17.6 10.9 53.4 0.0 
Uruguay 1985 32.0 17.0 12.0 14.1 0.0 
Venezuela 1989 30.6 15.7 13.0 44.1 5.0 
Source: ECLAC (1985), Edwards (1997), Lora 2001 and World Bank. 
a Chile had two trade reform processes. 
 
The trade policy reform processes shared four basic features:3 
a) Reduced coverage of non-tariff barriers;  
b) Substantial reduction of tariff barriers; depth and rapidity; 
c) Reduced dispersion of tariff protection; and 
d) Reduction or elimination of export tax. 
Trade liberalisation was coupled with the opening of the capital account in most countries, 
which resulted in a strong appreciation of the real exchange rate by the mid nineties that continued 
until 1998 (see Ffrench-Davis, 1999 and ECLAC, 2004).  
Figure 1 depicts an index for the reforms constructed by Eduardo Lora at the IDB for the 
period from 1985 to 1999. This index measures economic reforms in the areas of trade policy, 
financial systems, privatizations, the labour market and taxation. This General Index (GI) ranges 
from 0 (no reforms) to 1 (full reforms). Elements making up the GI can also take values between 0 
and 1. For simplicity, figure 1 shows only the data corresponding to the GI and to the Trade Policy 
Index (TPI). It can be seen that the GI went from around 0.341 in 1985 to 0.583 in 1999. The TPI 
went from 0.522 to 0.885 in the same period, signalling that by the end of the century this reform 
was the most advanced in the region.4 Interestingly, this index stabilised in the mid nineties, when 




                                                     
3 Edwards (1997) and Ffrench-Davis (1999). 
4 The TPI is made up of tariff averages and dispersion. The purpose of this index is to measure changes in policies and not of 
outcomes. The other component of GI that has been a major driver of its increase during the decade is the one that measures the 
degree of reforms in the financial sector. Other indexes show varied degrees of progress. 



















Source: Lora (1997 and 2001). 
 
One feature of this liberalisation process in the region is that it has been accompanied by an 
increase of intraregional trade agreements, which have been complementary to trade opening. 
Although this was not the first time in the history of Latin America that countries used regional 
agreements actively (e.g. the LAFTA in 1961 and the Andean Pact in 1969), the present process 
has important differences with the previous experiences:5 
a) It is based on wide-ranging free trade agreements, that is, that cover a substantial fraction 
of traded goods; 
b) The process takes place within the framework of an “outward looking” development plan, 
as opposed to the former import-substituting scheme;  
c) It incorporates the many dimensions of trade, services, investments, intellectual property 
rights in addition to the traditional aspects of trade in goods; and  
d) The search for agreements is not limited to —although it does prioritise initially— the 
countries in the region, especially the members of the Latin American Integration Association 
(ALADI). Countries have moved on to integrate with the US, Canada, the European Union, Asia-
Pacific economies, the latter being particularly the case of Chile and Mexico. 
International trade under the bilateral and plurilateral agreements has ballooned in the past 
few years, and has gained great significance in the region. Some countries have even entered 
agreements outside the area (table 2).  
Table 2 shows how imports in the region relating to some type of agreement increased during 
the nineties, to 21% of the total if Mexico and Chile are excluded. These two nations have been the 
leaders, but the process permeates the whole region. If negotiations between Colombia, Ecuador 
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and Peru and the United States are concluded as expected in early 2005, imports covered by trade 
agreements including members from outside the region may soar. 
Table 2 
PERCENTAGE OF IMPORTS COVERED BY TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 ITA ETA ALL 
 1991 2003 1991 2003 1991 2003 
Latin America 7.4 11.8 0.0 42.3 7.4 54.1 
Latin America (excluding 
Chile and Mexico) 
11.4 20.8 0.0 0.0 11.4 20.8 
Argentina 20.8 32.1 0.0 0.0 20.8 32.1 
Bolivia 3.7 54.8 0.0 0.0 3.7 54.8 
Brazil 10.7 15.4 0.0 0.0 10.7 15.4 
Chile 3.9 37.4 0.0 40.2 3.9 77.6 
Colombia 9.4 19.3 0.0 0.0 9.4 19.3 
Ecuador 7.0 27.5 0.0 0.0 7.0 27.5 
Mexico 0.3 1.4 0.0 80.6 0.3 32.0 
Paraguay 30.0 55.3 0.0 0.0 30.0 55.3 
Peru 14.8 34.9 0.0 0.0 14.8 34.9 
Uruguay 41.0 48.2 0.0 0.0 41.0 48.2 
Venezuela 3.6 16.9 0.0 0.0 3.6 16.9 
Source: ECLAC (2004), Table 5.8. 
Notes: Latin America includes all Central American countries, Cuba, Panama and the Dominican 
Republic. 
ITA: Intraregional Trade Agreements; ETA: Extraregional Trade Agreements. 
 
As a result of the trade policy reforms, it is worth noting that the composition of exports has 
changed remarkably in the region. Although this is not common to every country, Mexico and 
Central America, together with Panama and the Dominican Republic have changed their exports 
from commodities to manufactured goods, under special US market access programs. In South 
American countries, this has been less intense. One related development has been the concentration 
of exports from Mexico, Central American countries and the Dominican Republic in the United 
States market. South American exports, meanwhile, have kept a more balanced structure regarding 

















TRADE IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Notes: (a) Includes: Argentina, bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
(b) Excluding Brazil and Mexico. 
 
Table 3 shows the composition of trade in selected economies in Latin America. Between 
1990 and 2002, manufacturing exports became important in these countries’ trade. However, Brazil 
shows the most stability, and these figures are explained substantially because of developments in 
Mexico.  
Despite the fact that the trade policy reform in Latin America has been significant, the 
populations putting reforms under question have enjoyed few tangible benefits. Some have argued 
that the reforms have produced no gains for the region in terms of increased economic growth, 









1990 1995 2002 1990 1995 2002 1990 1995 2002 1990 1995 2002
% % % % % % % % % % % %
Exports
Commodities 43.0 27.6 27.9 54.5 34.7 41.0 19.7 16.0 19.9 46.9 16.2 11.2
Agriculture 13.8 12.3 9.4 17.4 15.5 13.4 10.8 9.6 11.1 9.6 6.0 2.8
Mining 5.0 4.3 3.4 4.1 5.4 5.0 8.9 6.2 5.9 2.3 0.7 0.2
Energy 24.3 10.9 15.1 33.1 13.9 22.7 0.0 0.1 2.9 35.0 9.5 8.2
Manufactures 56.4 71.9 71.2 45.1 64.7 57.8 79.1 82.6 78.4 52.8 83.5 88.7
Traditional 19.1 23.0 21.9 18.6 23.9 22.3 28.7 31.5 29.1 8.6 15.8 18.7
Food, beverages and tobacco 10.2 10.9 9.6 10.2 12.9 12.7 16.5 17.5 16.0 2.7 2.0 2.4
Other Traditional 8.9 12.1 12.4 8.5 11.0 9.5 12.2 14.0 13.1 5.9 13.7 16.3
Scale-intensive 24.3 26.9 18.0 23.8 31.6 24.3 30.8 30.7 23.4 17.3 12.6 6.4
Durables 5.3 9.1 11.9 0.7 4.0 4.3 6.8 7.5 7.8 13.1 22.7 24.8
Diffusers of technical progress 7.7 12.9 19.5 1.9 5.1 7.0 12.8 13.0 18.0 13.8 32.5 38.8
Other 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.6 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.7 0.3 0.2 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Imports
Commodities 16.5 9.4 9.5 11.6 9.8 12.1 33.2 14.4 16.2 9.0 4.9 4.7
Agriculture 5.7 4.7 4.1 4.8 4.9 4.8 5.2 5.5 4.7 7.1 3.7 3.2
Mining 1.5 0.9 0.6 1.3 0.9 0.8 2.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.5 0.4
Energy 9.2 3.8 4.8 5.5 4.0 6.6 25.6 7.7 10.4 0.7 0.6 1.1
Manufactures 83.2 88.5 90.0 87.8 89.3 87.4 66.8 85.6 83.8 90.9 88.2 94.6
Traditional 15.3 18.7 18.2 12.9 17.9 17.0 11.2 15.8 9.6 21.0 23.2 22.1
Food, beverages and tobacco 6.0 5.2 4.0 4.2 5.5 4.8 5.6 6.5 2.5 8.2 3.1 3.5
Other Traditional 9.4 13.5 14.3 8.8 12.4 12.1 5.7 9.3 7.1 12.8 20.1 18.7
Scale-intensive 25.2 24.3 22.6 31.2 26.2 26.9 21.8 25.8 27.4 21.5 17.7 16.4
Durables 10.4 12.5 11.0 10.4 13.9 10.1 3.7 12.8 6.5 15.6 8.2 13.3
Diffusers of technical progress 32.3 33.0 38.2 33.3 31.4 33.3 30.1 31.1 40.3 32.9 39.1 42.7
Other 0.2 2.1 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 6.9 0.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Latin America (b)Latin America (a) Brazil Mexico
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Table 4 
COEFFICIENTS OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
(percentages of the gross domestic product at constant prices) 
Source: www.eclac.cl 
(a) Includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. 
 
 
The expansion of trade in general and of exports of goods and services was the driving force 
of economic growth in the 1990s. This pushed the ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP 
from 12.5% to 21.5%., table 4. 
However, economic growth in the region was modest during the decade. This has raised a 
debate regarding the true benefits of the reforms, especially if contrasted with the region’s 





     Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002
     Argentina M   9.7   4.5   4.5   10.9   13.5   11.9   6.6
 X   5.7   8.1   10.0   10.5   12.4   13.3   15.2
     Bolivia M   15.7   19.2   25.1   27.2   30.4   28.5   29.9
 X   14.5   13.5   19.3   22.5   20.4   22.4   24.5
     Brazil M   7.9   4.7   5.1   10.0   10.6   10.5   9.1
 X   5.0   7.7   7.5   8.2   10.3   11.3   12.0
     Chile M   35.5   19.9   18.5   26.0   28.8   28.8   28.4
 X   24.3   26.8   24.5   27.7   33.5   34.4   34.2
     Colombia M   21.4   16.8   9.6   21.0   16.7   18.4   18.1
 X   17.4   15.1   13.7   14.5   19.0   19.2   18.2
     Ecuador M   31.4   20.6   20.5   25.4   21.9   24.3   27.4
 X   19.7   22.5   14.7   19.9   21.1   19.8   19.2
     Mexico M   17.3   10.7   18.0   22.6   41.5   41.6   40.9
 X   10.3   15.3   14.9   24.6   36.2   35.7   35.2
     Paraguay M   24.7   19.5   29.0   55.3   30.9   29.7   28.5
 X   19.6   18.5   24.5   37.6   17.6   17.1   20.1
     Peru M   13.5   8.5   10.5   18.0   16.5   16.5   9.6
 X   13.6   14.4   11.3   12.5   18.2   19.5   8.4
     Uruguay M   19.6   12.0   12.4   20.1   21.9   20.8   15.8
 X   16.9   22.9   16.5   19.7   21.7   20.7   20.3
     Venezuela M   32.1   25.5   19.0   23.9   28.2   30.9   24.6
 X   27.6   30.8   26.9   29.4   32.5   31.3   31.8
        Total (a) M   14.8   9.4   11.2   16.9   22.5   22.5   20.8
 X   10.3   12.9   12.5   15.8   21.1   21.5   21.5
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II. What does Participating in Policy 
Formulation Mean? 
In the framework defined by Putnam (1993), international 
negotiations take place in a two-level game. The first level represents 
the negotiation that takes place between states or international 
organisations and is handled by government representatives, but taking 
into account domestic concerns: the second level.  
In the second level negotiations with domestic interests takes 
place, in order to reflect those point of view in the first level, to ensure 
that the results achieved at that level will be subsequently accepted 
and ratified. At the second level, all stakeholders that can influence the 
ratification of the results of the negotiation participate. These may 
range from Congress members to various representatives of the civil 
society.  
The society’s participation in formulating public policies 
generally and trade policies in particularly is a major concern, but 
developing countries lack a defined, solid, traditionally influential 
institutionality to allow that participation. Trade policy making has 
become increasingly complex and trade related matters are dealing 
with highlight sensitive domestic policy issues, like environment, 
public health, labour and social policies, together with the traditional 
problems arising from the short term impact of trade liberalization on 
non-competitive industries. 
Participation is defined as the process whereby stakeholders can 
influence or share part of the control over priorities, policy 
Trade Policy Making in Latin America: A Compared Analysis 
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formulation and resource allocation, together with assuring public access to goods and services 
(World Bank, 2004). 
Participation is not a synonym of consensus. In fact, the confusion that exists between the 
two terms can lead to conflict and frustration in the society. Participation may result in a 
consensual decision or course of action, but the society’s objective is to allow policy-makers to 
choose between different actions and identify more accurately the transactions that arise from 
them, and the related costs and benefits.  
In the area of trade policy, economic theory and practice recognise that it involves winners 
and losers. These permit those responsible for policy conduct to weigh the consequences of specific 
policy courses, assess costs, benefits and timing of policy actions and to create the necessary public 
policies to smooth the transition from old to new status (e.g. from trade barriers to trade 
liberalisation) and/or build coalitions in favour of certain course of action.  
Then what is the advantage of participating?6 As aforesaid, participation favours the 
adoption of better-informed decisions. However, other elements exist that warrant an express 
policy to encourage participation. In the first place, it allows for the creation of alliances of various 
interests in favour of set objectives. Second, it creates a sense of ownership of adopted decisions, 
even if they oppose certain interests defended by them. Third, it contributes to sustainability of 
policies over time: it reduces the chances of backlash if participation is solid and decisions taken 
are considered legitimate in their origin and outcome. Fourth, participation, by providing a seal of 
legitimacy, favours increased policy effectiveness because it fosters order and sequence for more 
informed decisions. Lastly, participation permits society to demand more accountability of those in 
charge of public policies. 
Nonetheless, some risks exist that require responsible management. Particularly, risks 
associated to exclusions, because the various interests are not properly represented. Both over  
—and under— representation may exist. Risks associated with mistaken expectations of outcomes; 
risks of exacerbating existing conflicts in society among different interests because the process is 
managed inappropriately; and risks of eroding institutions and other formal decision-making 
mechanisms by failing to take them into account in the participation process. 
Finally, it must be kept in mind that participation in public policy formulation is normally 
specific to each country. This does not imply that in those countries with no participating tradition 
such status should be maintained. It rather means that each country must build its own institutional 
arrangement to gradually create instances of participation at different moments or stages along the 
process: formulation, adoption or implementation of policies. Though, taking into account the 
particulars of each country and depending on the type of policy involved. For example, 
participation is not the same to solve a “local” problem, such as specific environmental issues, as to 
deal with nation-wide matters, such as an economy's trade policy, (World Bank, 2004).  
This explains the difficulties that exist in Latin America for creating and adopting 
participation mechanisms in the field of trade policy. Nevertheless, due to the cost associated to 
policy reversal, the existence of conflicting interests in the society together with an increasingly 
complex trade agenda makes participation in the trade policy field more necessary. 
Moreover, the fact that trade policy changes may cause injury to others countries interests 
and can generate the adoption of retaliatory measures to compensate the losses, creates the need to 
build a strong domestic support for policies to ensure stability over time and avoid dispute between 
trading partners. 
 
                                                     
6 See World Bank (2004). 
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III. Formulating Trade Policy in Latin 
America 
In recent years, the intense negotiations conducted in Latin 
American countries have awakened the interest for knowing what are 
the institutional arrangements that best support these countries’ trade 
policies and how to reach more consensual policies. The objective of 
this section is to identify common elements and not to highlight the 
differences between countries. This approach does not ignore that 
some weakness are more important for some countries than for others, 
but the problems raised are present in almost all the cases. 
The analysis defines four types of players taking part in the 
process of formulating trade policy: i) Governments or executive 
power; ii) Congress or legislative power; iii) Civil society; and iv) 
Trade partners.  
Trade policymaking takes place in a general political and 
institutional context. In fact, it is the result of the level or depth of 
democratic regimes, to what extend there is a long tradition of 
democratic ruling in a country, the strength of the political system, 
“presidential” or semi-presidential, the role played by political parties, 
and the organization of civil society, that will determine the quality of 
policies.7  
Latin American history is characterized, in general, by weak 
democracies and short democratic traditions. In the last 25 years 
democratic regimes began to be established in the region, and an 
                                                     
7 Quality is defined in terms of stability vs. volatility, flexibility vs. rigidity, coordination vs. coherence, decisiveness vs. resoluteness; 
see Alston, Melo, Mueller and Pereira (2004). 
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evolution towards a deeper participation in the public policy process has taken place “au fur et à 
mesure”. We observed that countries with a stronger democratic tradition, stable political system, 
respected institutions and with a clear system of checks and balances will tend to prepare, adopt 
and apply better policy with positive outcomes. Furthermore problem in trade policy making 
reflects more general problems of policy making in the region.8 
Countries with imperfect and weak political institutions will promote high transactions cost 
in policymaking, cooperation among players will be more difficult, quality of decision making, 
policies and implementation will be impair leading to volatile or rigid and less transparent and 
coherent policies.  
Despite differences across Latin American countries because of the degree of maturity of 
their trade reforms (for instance, Chile and Mexico, and the rest of the countries analyzed), some 
elements are common to all. First, the legal tradition of South American countries places foreign 
policy and trade policy conduct in the Executive Power, with a secondary role for congresses. In 
effect, in most countries the Constitution assigns the Executive Power the responsibility of 
conducting foreign policy and of negotiating and signing international agreements. In this context, 
the task of the Congress is to approve or reject the terms and conditions of negotiations carried out 
by the Government, but there is no active role assigned in the Constitutions ex-ante to Congresses.  
In general trade institutions in the Region are very weak, with the exception of Brazil, Chile 
Colombia and Mexico, have limited budget resources, low technical capacity, and are under staffs. 
Until a decade ago, they played a secondary role mostly to administer prices, trade restrictions, and 
respond to protectionist interest and fiscal needs: trade institutions have been low priority for most 
governments up to now. Because, public service salaries are low, public servants that acquire a 
marginal expertise in trade policy making have become very appreciate in the market place, and are 
tempted by offers of better salary in the private sector.   
Also, most Congresses have assumed a passive stand, in the sense that they intervene after 
the negotiations, only when results are submitted to their consideration, not in the earlier stages. 
Thus, in practice, the Executive Power is the main political force behind trade policy initiatives. It 
is interesting to note that there are no impediments to Congresses to increase their involvement in 
the processes of formulating, adopting and implementing international trade policies and economic 
negotiations, without having to alter any constitutional provisions.  
In recent years, Mexico has experienced a change in relative power as a consequence of 
modification in the political scenario. The fact that the President has no majority representation in 
the Congress has produced a stronger involvement of this latter institution in economic policy 
making in general, and trade policy in particular, Ortiz Mena (2004).9  
The recent experience of South America is that the civil society's participation has evolved 
over time. With varying degrees of effectiveness or interest, the entrepreneurial sector has 
traditionally influenced negotiations. However, as economic liberalisation has become the 
dominating policy paradigm, this sector's participation has changed. Civil Society interest groups 
involved with the cultural, environmental or labour-related issues have begun to intervene and are 
gradually increasing their participation.  
As for the influence of trade partners, going back to Putnam (1993) framework, a number of 
elements intervene in the formulation of trade policy. Because of the Latin American countries' 
level of influence, individually or collectively, the second level is not always relevant when it 
                                                     
8 See Morón and Sanborn (2004) for an analysis of the Peruvian case. 
9  Other countries have also in process of reviewing their trade policy making. For instance, in Peru Congress is analyzing a draft law 
for trade negotiations that gives the Congress a more active role in this area, see New Review International Trade and Negotiations, 
Latin American Trade Network, Year 3, N 134, 19 August, 2005, Buenos Aires, Argentina.  
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comes to influencing first-level negotiations. As we mentioned before, it will depend on what type 
of negotiation one is dealing with. In multilateral trade negotiations influence is relatively low, 
therefore the effort to organize and participate tends to be lower. Although, in the context of the 
current Doha Round of multilateral negotiations, developing countries, including Latin America,  
have pursued their interest through coaltion bulding enhancing their influence at the WTO. 
In the other hand, it is worth noting that when considering starting negotiations with the 
U.S., countries began thinking of the need to increase the participation of non-governmental 
players in formulating, adopting and applying trade policy. Mexico and Chile created specials 
committee to incorporate private sectors representative early in the process, see Ortiz Mena (2001), 
Silva (2001) and Porras (2003). More recently, Colombia,10 Peru and Ecuador have improved their 
consultation process with private sector representative and other members of the civil society to 
face negotiations with the U.S. 
Actually, it is observed in most countries reduced and narrowed participation channels in the 
trade policy area during the Uruguay Round negotiations, and, to a much greater extent, in previous 
negotiations in the GATT. The possibility of conducting negotiations for a free trade agreement 
directly with the US (or indirectly, through the Free Trade Area of the Americas, FTAA) brought 
about the preoccupation for extending and enhancing the participation of private players in the 
initiative. Also, however, participation is an element that is strongly driven from outside the 
countries, be it as a requirement to improve the “transparency” of these processes that arises as a 
domestic need of the trade partners themselves, particularly the US and Canada, and, to a lesser 
extent, the European Union. The exception has been the experience of MERCOSUR, that in 1994 
created the Economic Social Consultative Forum in the Ouro Preto Protocol, integrated by 
representatives of the government, entrepreneurs, and workers11. These regional process have 
influenced the negotiating process in other foras, like WTO, improving Latin American countries 
partipation. 
A. The Legislative Power 
The constitutions of the countries in our sample share four common principles: i) foreign 
relations are conducted by the Executive Power; ii) the Executive Power has the authority to 
negotiate international agreements; iii) the Legislative Power has the authority to approve or reject 
agreements proposed by the Executive Power; and iv) the provisions in international agreements 
dominate over domestic laws, although this is not always stated specifically in the constitutions.  
Hence, legislative powers play a significant role in the agreements' approval, which explains 
their poor involvement in the earlier stages of trade policy formulation. Add to this certain legal 
principles that are common to Latin American countries regarding the operation of specific 
agreements. For example, in the framework of the Agreement that created the Latin American 
Integration Association (ALADI, in spanish) in 1980, any trade agreements entered into by 
members of the Association do not require subsequent Congress approval. This means that in the 
Latin American integration process, congresses participate only marginally. 
A second aspect that must be taken into account is that the legislative powers approve the 
agreements as such and, as aforesaid, they prevail over domestic legislation. In addition, countries 
are members of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, but provisions therein do not 
always specify the corresponding obligations thoroughly. Part of the implementation problems that 
                                                     
10 Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, República de Colombia: Tratado de Libre Comercio: Línea Política Presidencial, 
2004, power point presentation. 
11    Marconini (2005). 
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occur in some countries in the region originate in this model of incorporating obligations, because 
it is rarely possible to know how and to what extent the new agreements have amended or 
derogated domestic regulations that might conflict with some of the provisions in the new treaty. 
Furthermore, in countries like Chile and Mexico, that are members of several FTAs, that may have 
marginally different provisions, the full extend of the application of different disciplines is 
relatively complicated to follow.  
Another problem observed in the Latin American experience is that Congress members have 
at their disposal very scarce human and financial resources to support their work. This means that 
priorities are assigned to other activities that have a greater impact on the domestic issues they 
handle, rather than orienting these resources to dealing with international matters. 
In summary, in the Latin American countries analysed, legislative powers play an important 
part in the formulation of trade policy ex-post, especially when it involves international 
agreements. However, this role, even if not specified thus de jure, in practice is more important in 
the approval stages of the agreements. The latter stages require more knowledge and technical 
backup to ensure that they are fully aware of the implications of the commitments assumed. In 
some countries due to changes in political conditions, like Mexico, this is changing, Ortiz Mena 
(2004). In Chile a set of constitutional amendments that are under considerations in the Congress, 
includes a modification of the role played by legislative power, but it is a matter of time to assess 
its impact. 
B. The Executive Power: L’État c’est moi 
In most South American countries, the Executive Power conducts trade policy and, 
accordingly, it has the authority to negotiate international agreements that it subsequently submits 
to Congress for approval. Once the agreement has been so ratified, its provisions prevail over 
domestic regulations.  
Within this legal framework, trade policy arising from international agreements is a key 
component of foreign policy, which is primarily conducted and oriented by the President himself. 
This is one difference with other countries whose heads of state have fewer degrees of freedom to 
take decisions, and normally must lobby with politicians or entrepreneurs to legitimise his 
resolutions.  
As to who is responsible within the Executive Power to carry out the negotiations, it varies. 
Some countries have a Foreign Trade Minister, others rely on their Foreign Affairs Ministers, 
Jordania and Ramió (2002). However, whatever the arrangement, most face several operation 
problems.  
In fact, after defining who will be responsible for conduct in a specific entity, either the 
Foreign Trade or the Foreign Affairs Minister, co-ordination and competition problems arise 
between ministries that undermine the process of formulating, adopting and enforcing foreign trade 
decisions and policies. Some countries have a more centralized system, whereby one or two 
institutions dominate the process. In other, the process is more fragmented and policy formulation 
is less efficient.  
For instance, Jordania and Ramió (2002) considers that Brazil, Chile and Mexico have a less 
fragmented policy system, dominated by Foreign Affairs Ministries in the formers and by Economy 
in the latter. Although, in the case of countries with a high fragmented system, under the definition 
of these authors, like Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador or Uruguay, it is not possible to assert that 
they performed significantly worst than the formers.   
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One explanation for this is that, despite the fact that conduct is clearly defined, the ministries 
in charge of the issues domestically resist abiding by the rulings of another entity, plus the areas of 
internal and external competence are not always well bounded. In addition, because these 
ministries or agencies will have to deal with sectoral problems that will arise from the domestic 
commitments and will have to respond to public opinion, political authorities and even the courts of 
justice, regarding the benefits and costs of policies adopted, and must implement the international 
agreements that often clash with domestic policies, teamwork can be pretty burdensome. 
Furthermore, centralized system may alienate others agencies reducing the sense of ownership of 
results because of the reduce participation of in the decision making.  
According to Ventura-Dias (2004), in Latin American states, because of their very nature, 
with major shortcomings in institutionality and accountability, public officials have great latitude 
to follow their own political preferences. Considering also that issues contained in international 
agreements are of increasing technical complexity and are difficult to follow up, it is no surprise 
that public officials have significant influence in policy definitions. On the other hand, 
bureaucracies related to foreign affairs are more stable than other bureaucracies in the public 
apparatus, so they handle more information and are more influential.  
In addition, the jobs of high-ranking officials —ministers included— are uncertain in their 
duration, so they are pressed for quick results and are caught by the urgent matters of every day. 
Because of this, they rely on lower-rank officials with more experience in the area and with a 
longer “institutional memory”. All this favours the influence of public officials over other players.  
Newcomers, such as representatives of the civil society and Congress members are beginning 
to acquire more means to influence and changing policy making, but have scarce resources to form 
and support their functions (Lengyel and Ventura-Dias, 2004).  
In order to assure the conduct of trade policies and international negotiations, most countries 
have implemented co-ordinating mechanisms with varying success, depending on the political will 
of participants but, more often than not, the primary determinant is the personality of officials in 
charge. This is so because co-ordinating mechanisms do not necessarily result from a legal 
obligation, but rather from political arrangements between the main responsible parties, and they 
are not always respected (see table 5).12 
It is not possible to reach a clear relationship between the degree of formality of the 
consultation/participation mechanisms and policy results. In fact, following Jordania and Ramió 
(2002) classification, we find that countries with high degree of formality, like Bolivia, Chile, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic and Uruguay, can have different qualities of policy. In the 
other hand countries like Costa Rica and Peru that have a lower degree in formality are examples of 
different policy performance, even among themselves.  
One explanation is that a frequent problem found in many countries, is a substantial lack of 
resources, both human and financial, to participate properly in a series of negotiating processes that 
are taking place simultaneously, among others: the Doha Round of the WTO, FTAA, and bilateral 
negotiations. This means that a very formal consultation/participation mechanism may be 
ineffective if the actors that intervened are not well prepared to contribute to the decision making 
process.  
For this reason, countries have recently made efforts to strengthen foreign trade activities by 
taking advantage of the various technical co-operation initiatives that are being offered by regional 
international organisations, such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Inter American 
Development Bank (IADB), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
                                                     
12 In this study we followed our classification based on more recent information and others sources. 
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(ECLAC), and multilateral organisations like the World Bank, the United Nations Conference for 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Table 5 
CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Country  Entity 
responsible for 
negotiations 
Other relevant entities Formal Public 
Co-ordination 
Mechanisms 
Formal Public/ Private 
Co-ordination 
Mechanisms 
Argentina Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cult 
Ministry of Economic 
Affairs 
NO National Council of 
International Trade in 
November of 002 
Ad-hoc 
Bolivia Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Ministry of Economic 
Development; Ministry of 
Finance; Ministry of 





in Ad-hoc and Inter-
institutional Committee  
Brazil Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Ministries of Finance, 
Agriculture, Development, 
Industry and Foreign 
Trade, Planning, and Head 
of the Civil House of the 
Presidency of the 
Republic. 
CAMEX  
Decree Nº 4732, 




Colombia Ministry of Foreign 
Trade 
Ministries of Economic 
Development, Foreign 
Trade, Foreign Affairs, 
Finance, Agriculture, 
Mining and Energy, Head 
of Department of National 
Planning, Central Bank, 
and President of the 
Republic.  
Superior Council 
of Foreign Trade 
Mixed Foreign Trade 
Commission 
Chile Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Ministries of Finance, 
Economic Affairs, 
Agricultural and General 




Public/ Private Council 
(has no legal status)  





Ministries of Finance and 
Economic Affairs, 




Mexico Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 
Departments of Finance, 
Economic Affairs, 
Agriculture, Foreign Affairs  
Inter-ministerial 
Commission for 
the Free Trade 
Agreement 
Advising Council for the 
Free Trade Agreement 
Co-ordinating Council of 
Entrepreneurial Foreign-
trade Organisms 
Peru Ministry of Foreign 
Trade y Tourism 
Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Finance and 
Economic Affairs, 
Agriculture and Production 
NO  
Ad-hoc 




Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs, Ministry 
of Cattle, Agriculture and 
Fishing 
NO Ad-hoc 
Source: Ostry (2002), Robin (2004) and Lengyel and Ventura-Dias (2004). 
 
These institutions have encouraged the formation of public officials responsible for 
international negotiations, in addition to sponsoring seminars and conferences to disseminate the 
foreign trade agenda to a wider public. 
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Another frequent problem is that the work performed in the public arena is not always 
backed by economic studies and analyses assessing the probable consequences of the policy 
options at hand. This reflects the shortage of technical resources in the public sector to do the 
needed studies, the lack of financial resources to hire them from private experts and, finally, to the 
dynamics of the negotiating agendas of the countries, which, again, participate in a number of 
initiatives at the same time.  
The pace at which the trade reforms have been developed in the region, together with the 
intense negotiating agendas in most countries, have made it difficult to have a strategic vision of 
trade policy. Actually, in several countries, representatives from both the public and the civil 
society often mention the absence of clear guidelines as the main weakness of their countries’ trade 
policies.  
But this is also a function of the degree of maturity achieved by the reform processes and 
their outcomes and of the economic moment they are experiencing. In effect, in those countries 
where reforms have been in place longer and have been deeper (Mexico and Chile), there is wider 
consensus regarding the orientation of trade policy. Where trade reforms are more recent or 
shallower, and with mixed results, consensus is lower. This, even independently of the quality of 
the institutional arrangements in effect (e.g., Colombia, Langebaek, 2002).  
Hence, a preliminary conclusion that can be drawn from South America’s experience is that, 
whatever the institutional arrangement, countries with the greatest consensus on the direction of 
trade policy are those where the reform process is deeper, more mature, and with more positive 
results. 
C. Relationship between the public sector and the civil society13 
Recently, the way non-governmental organizations in South American countries participate 
in the formulation, adoption and implementation of trade policy has been evolving. According to 
Ostry (2002), the change from an import-substitution policy to trade liberalisation altered the policy 
parameters under which economic agents used to operate. In the previous model, trade policy 
orientation favoured a close and non-transparent relationship among representatives of the 
bureaucracy and the private sector directly affected by policy decisions (Lengyel, 2004).  
Also, as the MERCOSUR members’ experience shows, the policy changes toward the 
creation of a common market, implied the need to incorporate to the process a wider base that 
would legitimise policy decisions coming “from above”.14 Finally, because reforms come from 
above and from outside (as a response of the debt crisis of the eighties), and they occur in 
democracies (except in the case of Chile) where some consensus must be built, have made it 
necessary to establish or improve participation mechanisms. 
Furthermore, as has been stress by Devlin, R. and A. Estevadeordal (2001) and Devlin and 
Giordano (2004), the new integration process differs widely with respect to the old paradigm based 
on import substitution policies, and incorporated a wide range of issues. The added complexity 
forced to open the door to new actors and interested parties that were not considered in the old 
trade policy making process.  
In a comparative view, it appears that most countries had very imperfect participation 
mechanisms until the mid-nineties. Actually, in most of South America, the civil society recognises 
                                                     
13 The term civil society includes a wide spectrum of non-governmental, non-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, 
and that express their interests and values based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations 
(World Bank, 2004). 
14 Bouzas and Avogadro (2004), da Motta Veiga (2004), Quijano (2004) and Marconini (2005). 
Trade Policy Making in Latin America: A Compared Analysis 
24 
that during the GATT’s Uruguay Round, the level of consultation with the public sector was low or 
null. It is interesting to note that, with the exception of MERCOSUR, the need to extend 
participation in formulating, adopting and implementing trade policies toward non-governmental 
interests arises as the response to the decision to negotiate a free trade agreement with the US. In 
the region, the pioneer in this scheme is Mexico, that established a wide consultation mechanism to 
deal with negotiations with the US, which some analysts have singled out as very effective (Alba 
and Vega, 2002), Ortiz Mena (2004).  
A similar deduction can be made for the rest of the countries in the region. Chile’s experience 
(Saez, 2002 and 2005) is actually similar in the sense that the technical work needed upon deciding 
to start negotiations with the US demands to establish a work relationship with the entrepreneurial 
community, and even with unions (Silva, 2001). Later on, when technical work began with the 
construction of the FTAA in 1994, and then negotiations as such in 1998, the demands from 
Canada and the U.S. for a transparent negotiation process, meant that domestically a brand new 
participation process had to be established in Latin American countries, although with dissimilar 
results. 
According to Quijano (2002) there are several reasons that fuel this increased participation, 
which in turn depend on the players’ motivations. In the first place, the Executive Power, 
responsible in Latin America for the outcome of negotiations, seeks to “legitimise” its decisions 
through wide participation. So those who have the privilege to take part and in and influence the 
process, support the results of the negotiations. In other words, they acquire a sense of belonging 
and ownership.  
Secondly, agents who feel affected, either positively or negatively, “demand” to participate 
in the process to make sure that they get these benefits, or to get protection or compensation for 
possible negative effects.  
Finally, those responsible in the Executive Power do not have full technical command 
necessary for good negotiation, and hence require the technical contribution of outside experts. In 
this case, participation serves to acquire “value added”.  
This, however, has nothing to do with the quality of participation. In fact, in all the countries 
analysed except Mexico and Chile, participation mechanisms have brought no horizontal 
improvement of participation. The reason is that private agents are not always in the position to 
contribute to the negotiation process in a timely and appropriate basis. As is often the case, 
associations surveyed in the private sector do not always have a research department, technical 
equipment or know-how on negotiation processes, nor do they allocate the necessary resources to 
respond to public sector inquiries (see Ostry, 2002 and Robin, 2004).  
Secondly, the quality of participation is often a function of the relative size of players 
consulted. In many countries, small and medium-sized enterprises believe their specific needs are 
not properly taken into account (even countries like Chile and Mexico). In other words, there is 
some inequality in participation that is a function of the size of the respective player, that may also 
implied political influence, of formal and informal relationships they may maintain with the proper 
persons and of the degree of transparency in the consultation process.  
Inequity is also observed in the way players are involved. It is normal to perceive that the 
world of big businesses has more fluid contact than the rest of the civil society. Actually, in the 
scheme of the “cuarto adjunto”, is essentially oriented at ensuring the participation of this category 
of the civil society. 
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Thirdly, in most cases the level of institutionalisation of procedures for participation is pretty 
low, which results in low possibilities to influence, weakness of discussed contents, and poor 
transparency (Lengyel, 2004).  
Handling diverging visions within the civil society is difficult everywhere. The participation 
of representatives of the civil society permits to know the different viewpoints that exist around 
trade policy and adopt more informed decisions. However, tension exists since many of said 
representatives coming from cultural, environmental and labour-related areas are against 
globalisation and free-trade agreements, and even request explicitly that protection mechanisms be 
adopted that are at odds with the general objectives of these processes. Culture is a good example. 
The question is how to ensure participation and at the same time adopt the best decision for all the 
interested parties? If in a negotiating process a country follows the desire of one sector, not to open 
it to competition, how this may affect sectors that are ready for competition? 
Also, in some experiences, consultation procedures vary from one case to another. Depth, 
quality and persistence over time of the consultation mechanisms used differ depending on the 
respective integration process. What causes this situation cannot be determined a priori, but three 
possible explanations can be proposed:  
a) consultation processes are not established as legal or formal requirements in the country, 
so not having them brings no legal, political or economic consequences; 
b) authorities in charge of trade policy are not always the same, and personal characteristics 
are very important in these mechanisms;  
c) there is deep mistrust between the public sector and civil society. The latter doubt the 
professional capacity of the former to carry out their responsibilities. The former are 
suspicious of the latter’s intentions with respect to the interests they stand for; and  
d) all members of the civil society do not have the same reaction to the different negotiation 
processes, but respond according to the threats and opportunities that each of them 
perceives. For instance, in Chile there was a more sympathetic/indifference approach 
towards negotiations with the European Union, but more concern with regards to 
negotiations with the U.S.   
Finally, the lack of a structured, legally established and mandatory scheme creates a 
confusion of roles. In some experiences, representatives of the private sector integrate negotiating 
teams, which arises doubts in the other party; and other members of the civil society who do not 
have the same access to such instances; there are problems of unregulated conflicts of interests and 
frustration when they cannot have the same level of participation in other processes. Also, members 








As was mention in the beginning, in recent years, the interest 
has arisen to know and understand how decisions on trade policy are 
taken in Latin America. Researchers have focus on the works by 
Putnam (1993), who studies international negotiations as a two-level 
game. The first level represents the negotiation that takes place 
between states or international organisations. In the second level are 
domestic negotiations, which must be conducted by those in charge of 
the first level, in order to ensure that the results achieved at that level 
will be subsequently ratified. Obviously, these games occur 
simultaneously and interact with each other constantly along the 
process.  
To what extent is the two-level approach applicable in Latin 
America? To what extent are other approaches more pertinent, like 
those that study the role of “bureaucracy policy” or “the power of the 
State”? In our opinion, the Latin American case is a mixture of 
schemes, which are more or less applicable depending on who are the 
actors —size of the countries— and the scope of the process 
(multilateral, plurilateral or bilateral negotiations) involved 
internationally, how deep is the democratic tradition of the country in 
question and what is the level of organisation and complexity of the 
civil society. When we say complexity, we mean the number of 
players involved, the type of interests they pursue, their level of 
representation and their capacity for mobilisation to protect their 
interests. 
Latin America shows differing realities on this issue and, 
therefore, different degrees of complexity in the second-level of 
negotiations. Also, because of the Latin American countries’ level of 
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 influence, individually or collectively, the second level is not always relevant when it comes to 
influencing first-level negotiations. As we mentioned before, it will depend on what type of negotiation 
one is dealing with. For instance, Lengyel and Ventura-Dias (2004) analyse this point from the 
perspective of the GATT’s Uruguay Round and its results. Within the context of UR negotiations, the 
influence of Latin American countries on the final outcome was low, and the influence of the group of 
developing countries and of several developed countries not in line with the United States or the 
European Union was also low. We mean the members of the Cairns Group that did not take part in the 
agricultural negotiations at Blair House that permitted concluding the UR. In this context, at the second 
level of negotiations there was little influence to be exerted on the results, and dissatisfied countries 
could not walk out of the negotiation process. 
This situation changes when negotiations are carried out in other contexts, such as bilateral or 
regional stances. Even when Latin American countries negotiate with larger partners like Canada, the 
U.S. or the EU, the relative difference of power (i.e. the reciprocal capacity to modify the other party’s 
position) is manageable (Robert, 2000). In this context, the second level of negotiation again becomes 
important, as pointed out by Putnam (1993).  
However, as correctly indicated by Ventura-Dias (2004), bureaucracies in Latin America play a 
major role in designing and orienting the decisions on trade policy. This is so for many reasons. First, 
because public officials in charge of these areas are associated to foreign affairs departments, they have a 
longer permanence in time than others. This gives them access to more information, historical memory 
and technical know-how than other players have, whether public or private. Regarding the private sector, 
it should be pointed out that Latin American private associations, although they enjoyed a privileged 
access to public officials, do not have a well-developed technical infrastructure and are currently in the 
process of gaining expertise. Other organisations in the civil society also face problems arising from lack 
of resources, which they solve largely through elaborate international networks.  
On the other hand, the Legislative Power assumes an important role in the final stage, when it 
must accept or reject the terms of negotiations. However, this does not explain why it doesn’t take a 
more committed part in earlier phases. The normal justification is that there are domestic political 
urgencies to attend to, or the lack of resources that means a shortage of backup staff or infrastructure to 
take a more active role.  
In addition, co-ordination and consultation mechanisms within the public sector —and between it 
and other relevant players, such as the Legislative Power and the civil society— appear to be very weak. 
These weaknesses come from a number of sources:  
a) No legal obligation exists to conduct these processes. Institutional arrangements are ad hoc 
and informal in terms of their procedures and substantive contents and objectives;  
b) When the legal obligation of co-ordination and consultation exists, institutional mechanisms 
are technically and politically fragile because, among other reasons, of institutional rivalries 
within the public sector, and the civil society mistrusts the public sector regarding their 
professional capacity to meet their responsibilities; and 
c) Institutions in the civil society lack the technical and financial resources to respond adequately 
to the consultation requirements of the public sector.  
The described institutional weaknesses partly explain why economic reforms in general  
—and trade policy in particular— have been questioned in Latin America. In recent years, various 
international and regional organisations have implemented many programs for technical assistance, 
institutional strengthening, and of trade reform dissemination and international negotiations. The 
purpose is to explain the extent and scope of the processes and prepare the countries overall, the public 
sector and the civil society, so they can reap the most benefits from the reforms applied, and improve 
their international integration. 
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